Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of the Political Offense Exception Under the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty by Groarke, John Patrick
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EXTRADITION TREATY
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In response to increasing terrorist activity against Western demo-
cratic countries, the United States has begun to amend its extradition1
treaties with such countries in order to facilitate the return and punish-
ment of fugitive terrorists.2
The first extradition treaty to be so altered is the one between the
United States and the United Kingdom.' This treaty was chosen be-
cause of three recent United States court decisions4 that barred the re-
turn of suspected Provisional Irish Republican Army ("PIRA") ter-
rorists to the United Kingdom for trial.' The courts denied the
extradition requests because they believed the acts committed by the
fugitive terrorists were "political" in nature, and therefore subject to
the political offense exception of article 5 of the United States-United
Kingdom Treaty of Extradition.' It is this political offense exception
t B.A. 1980, New York University; M.Sc. 1984, The London School of Econom-
ics and Political Science; Lecturer in Public International Law 1984-85, The Polytech-
nic of North London; J.D. Candidate 1988, University of Pennsylvania.
1 The Supreme Court has defined extradition as "the surrender by one nation to
another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory,
and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and to
punish him, demands [his] surrender." Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
2 See United States and United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty:
Hearings on Treaty Doc. 99-8 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Judge Abraham Sofaer,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State).
' Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T.
227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter 1972 Treaty].
" In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979),
reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. S9146 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
5 See Hearings, supra note 2, at 5 (statement of Judge Abraham Sofaer).
6 1972 Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5, (1)(c)(i), at 920.6; see Mackin, 668 F.2d at
137 (concluding that a magistrate had jurisdiction to decide the political offense ques-
tion, and that her decision that the offenses for which extradition was sought came
within the political offense exception was not appealable); Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at
276 ("[T]he facts of this case present the assertion of the political offense exception in
its most classic form."); McMullen, mag. No. 3-78-1099 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979)
("We find that the defendant has established . . . that the act of bombing the Claro
Barracks was political in character.").
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that has been redefined in the Supplementary Treaty entered into by
the United States and the United Kingdom.'
The new Supplementary Treaty no longer permits United States
judges to decide that a fugitive's violent acts constitute a political crime
and therefore immunize the fugitive from extradition." In its place, the
Supplementary Treaty provides that all fugitives accused of committing
violent acts can be extradited even if their acts were politically moti-
vated.' The Supplementary Treaty does, however, allow a court to
deny extradition if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
requesting state cannot provide the fugitive with a fair trial.'0
This Comment examines how the Supplementary Treaty affects
the extraditability of PIRA fugitives in the United States, and whether
or not there should be further treaties between the United States and its
allies. The problems federal judges will face in determining the fairness
of the trial a fugitive will receive if extradited will also be examined.
This Comment asserts that although the Supplementary Treaty
will be effective in preventing alleged PIRA terrorists from gaining ref-
uge in the United States, it still fails to balance adequately an alleged
terrorist's right to a fair trial against a democratic government's need to
protect itself against terrorism. It submits that a better way to deal with
this problem would be to establish a special court under the supervision
of a third party, the European Community, in order that alleged ter-
rorists may be tried in a more impartial atmosphere.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY
A. Extradition in American Law
Extradition is as old as international relations. The 1280 B.C.
peace treaty between Ramses II of Egypt and the Hittite King Hat-
tusili III, the second oldest known document in diplomatic history, con-
tained a provision calling for the return of criminals from one country
found in the territory of the other."1 It was not until the eighteenth
century, however, that international cooperation in the extradition of
criminals assumed its present character.'
2
' Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, United States-United King-
dom, S. EXEC. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1985), reprinted in 24 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1105-1109 (1985) [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty].
s See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
Supplementary Treaty, supra note 7, art. 1.
10 Id., art. 3.
11 See M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1.6 (1987).
12 See I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971). For a de-
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The first extradition treaty entered into by the United States or,
for that matter, by the United Kingdom, was the Jay Treaty of 1794.13
This treaty established the framework for all future United States-
United Kingdom extradition treaties.1 It provided for the return of
fugitives who had committed offenses listed within the treaty. 5 The
requesting state could only make a demand for a fugitive who had com-
mitted a treaty offense and had to present at least a prima facie show-
ing that the person sought had committed such an offense. 6
The list of extraditable offenses was expanded in the next Anglo-
American extradition treaty, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842.11
Subsequent additions to the list were made through supplementary
treaties signed in 1889, 1900, and 1905.1 The 1972 treaty lists twenty-
nine extraditable offenses.19
There is no United States statute that deals explicitly with the
substance of extradition law.2" Rather, the substantive law is codified in
the ninety-six extradition treaties the United States has with other
countries.21 Extradition procedures are, however, governed by statute22
and apply to all requests for fugitives in the United States.23
In brief, 18 U.S.C. § 3184 provides that after a requesting state
has made a demand for a fugitive, any federal magistrate or judge may
hold a hearing to consider the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
criminal charge under the treaty being used to authorize extradition. If
tailed discussion of eighteenth and early nineteenth century American extradition prac-
tice, see Evans, Legal Bases of Extradition in the United States, 16 N.Y.L.F. 525
(1970).
" Jay Treaty, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No.
105 [hereinafter Jay Treaty]; see I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 12-13.
14 See I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 13.
15 See Jay Treaty, supra note 13, at 2 (the treaty offenses included forgery and
murder); I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 13.
16 See I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 13.
17 Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat.
572, T.S. No. 119 (expanded list of offenses included arson, piracy, robbery, and as-
sault with intent to commit murder).
18 See I. Shearer, supra note 12, at 14 n.5. (noting that the 1889 treaty prevented
the extradition of political offenders).
19 1972 Treaty, supra note 3, art. III & annexed schedule.
20 See Banoff & Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders": The Political Offense
Exception to Extradition in United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 169,
175 (1984) ("Although the United States has made up for its tardy acceptance of extra-
dition by negotiating almost one hundred bilateral treaties, it has not yet enacted its
own substantive statute." (footnotes omitted)).
21 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982).
2. Id. § 3184.
23 Id.
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the evidence is found sufficient, the executive branch can choose
whether or not to return the fugitive.24
There are several important restrictions on a federal court's power
to authorize extradition. First, there must be an extradition treaty in
force between the United States and the requesting state.25 Second, the
crime the fugitive is accused of committing must be listed in the
treaty.26 Next, the crime of which the fugitive is accused must be a
criminal offense in both countries; this principle is usually known as
"double criminality. '2 7 Moreover, the requesting state can only try an
extradited fugitive for the crime for which she was extradited. This is
known as the "specialty" principle.2" Finally, a ftigitive cannot be ex-
tradited if her crime was "political" in nature. This is known as the
"political offense" exception and it is the major issue addressed in the
Supplementary Treaty. 9
B. The Political Offense Exception
There is no current universally accepted definition of a "political
24 See 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1982) ("The Secretary of State may order the person
committed under sections 3184 or 3185 of this title to be delivered to any authorized
agent of such foreign government, to be tried for the offense of which charged." (em-
phasis added)); Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 175-76.
25 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982); see Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 176. It has
been asserted that the basis for this policy is a concern for the rights of the accused to
due process and a suspicion of foreign criminal law processes. See Evans, supra note
12, at 525-26; see also Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 176 ("In contrast [to the U.S.],
other nations will extradite as a matter of comity, even if no treaty or convention exists
with the requesting state.").
28 See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886) ("[A] person who has
been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an
extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offences described in that treaty...
."); 6 M. WITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 732-33, 772 (1968); Banoff
& Pyle, supra note 20, at 176-77; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982) (A fugitive suspect
can be certified for extradition only if the fugitive is charged with committing "any of
the crimes provided for by [the] treaty or convention.").
27 See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 311 (1922) ("[Aln offense is extraditable
only if the acts charged are criminal by the laws of both countries."); Kelley v. Griffin,
241 U.S. 6 (1916) (same); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1903) (same); Banoff
& Pyle, supra note 20, at 177 ("This double criminality standard is widely accepted in
international extradition practice, but poses some problems when applied in the context
of a federal system which leaves the task of defining most crimes to state legislators.").
28 See Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907) (holding that a treaty should
not be used to "obtain the extradition of a person for one offense and then punish him
for another and different offense"); M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 352-60 (1974) [hereinafter M.BASSIOUNI, INTERNA-
TIONAL EXTRADITION] (providing a thorough discussion of the "specialty" principle);
Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 177.
2 See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 7, art. 1.
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offense." 30 Consequently, states have different views as to the scope of
the exception.3 What is clear is that most states will not extradite a
fugitive who has committed a "political" offense. 2
There are three basic policy reasons behind the political offense
exception. 3 One is a humanitarian concern for the individual being
sought. The exception protects the individual from an unfair or retalia-
tory trial by the requesting state, which, being the target of the alleged
offense, will function as both judge and jury.3 4 Another reason for hav-
ing the exception is that if such offenses were extraditable, the asylum
state could become involved in an internal political dispute in the re-
questing state and therefore be seen as "taking sides" in the dispute."5
Neutrality is important to the asylum state because today's political of-
fenders could become tomorrow's political leaders.3 6 A blanket policy of
nonextradition for political offenders best ensures the asylum state's
neutrality. 7
A final reason for having a political offense exception is that the
international community tends to view political offenses as less "anti-
30 See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 177-78; Gilbert, Terrorism and the Polit-
ical Offence Exemption Reappraised, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 695, 695 (1985) (sug-
gesting that the judiciary's attempts to determine whether "terrorist" acts fall within
the political offense exception may simply mask courts' otherwise overtly political deci-
sions); Lubet, Extradition Reform: Executive Discretion and Judicial Participation in
the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247, 253 (1982) (argu-
ing that the originators of the political offense exception deliberately left term "political
offense" undefined in order to keep its scope broad); Note, American Courts and Mod-
em Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 617-
19 (1981) ("[N]o attempt has been made to define 'political offense' . . . .").
" For a discussion of the different positions adopted by various states, see Garcia-
Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48
VA. L. REV. 1226, 1240-56 (1962); Gilbert, supra note 30, at 697-702.
32 See Lubet, supra note 30, at 251-52 (the exception is so universal that there is
an international "norm off] political asylum").
33 See S. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 180-81
(1966) ("[Ihf the individual had a right to revolt against tyranny, those who failed...
should be granted asylum in the countries to which they had fled."); Banoff & Pyle,
supra note 20, at 180-81; Gilbert, supra note 30, at 695 (Political exemption allowed
the asylum state to remain disinterested in the internal affairs of other sovereign
states.).
34 See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EX-
TRADITION 3 (1980).
See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 181; Gilbert, supra note 30, at 695.
See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 180-81.
3 See id. at 174 (discussing the effects of extradition on international tensions);
Cantrell, The Political Offense Exemption in International Extradition: A Compari-
son of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L.
REV. 777, 782 (1977) (Justifications for refusal to extradite are "bolstered by an un-
willingness to become entangled in the requesting state's internal affairs."); Note,
supra note 30, at 622 ("By exempting all political offenders from extradition, a nation
may also achieve the desirable goal of avoiding entanglement in the internal political
affairs of other states.").
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social" than ordinary criminal offenses. Indeed, a political offender
often is considered to be a hero. For example, the United States has
long considered revolutionaries struggling against totalitarian govern-
ments to be heroes. 8
There are generally two types of political offenses: pure and rela-
tive. Pure political offenses are those that are subversive toward a par-
ticular government or its leaders. Typical examples of pure political
crimes include treason, espionage and sedition. Since such acts are
usually not treaty offenses, they are not ordinarily extraditable
crimes.4°
Relative political offenses involve the commission of common
crimes in connection with a political act or event.4 ' When the common
crime is a treaty offense, the courts must decide if it falls on the politi-




Belgium was the first state to formalize the concept of the political
offense when it was codified in its extradition law of 1 October 1833." a
The exception was included in an extradition treaty concluded between
Belgium and France in 1834.44 The first United States extradition
treaty to contain the political offense exception was the one it concluded
with France in 1843.45 The political offense exception is currently a
part of all United States extradition treaties.'
11 See S. BEDI, supra note 33, at 180-81 (political offenders were sometimes seen
as heroes during the mid-nineteenth century); Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 180
("Political offenders [are sometimes regarded) as fighting against tyrannical
governments.").
" See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 178; Note, supra note 30, at 623-24.
40 See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 178.
41 See id.; Note, supra note 30, at 624. For a further discussion of pure and
relative political offenses, see Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Po-
litical Offenses Exception in Extradition-A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Un-
ruly Problem, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 217, 245-254 (1969); Cantrell, supra note 37, at
780-82; Garcia-Mora, supra note 31, at 1239; Note, The Political Offense Exception to
Extradition: A 19th Century British Standard in 20th Century American Courts, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1009 (1984).
42 See I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 169 (describing English court interpreta-
tions); see also In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[I]t is proper
for the Court to consider the nature of an organization, its structure, and its mode of
internal discipline, in deciding whether the act of its members can constitute political
conduct under an appropriate interpretation of the Treaty.").
41 See I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 167; Note, supra note 30, at 620. At least
one prominent international jurist has asserted that Belgium enacted the law to protect
fugitives because it had successfully revolted against the Netherlands in 1830. See 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 645 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
See I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 167; Gilbert, supra note 30, at 696.
" See I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 167.
48 See Lubet, supra note 30, at 250; Note, Eliminating the Political Offense Ex-
ception for Violent Crimes: The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Supplemen-
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Generally, there have been three different approaches to defining
the scope of the political offense exception.17 One approach, the so-
called "injured rights" test, has been developed by the French courts.
As enunciated in the 1947 case of In re Giovanni Gatti,"8 the injured
rights test includes among "political offenses" only those offenses that
directly threaten the state. In Giovanni Gatti, France granted the ex-
tradition request of the Republic of San Marino for one of its nationals
who tried to kill a member of a communist cell.4" In its opinion, the
French Court of Appeals distinguished political crimes from common
crimes:
In brief, what distinguishes the political crime from the com-
mon crime is the fact that the former only affects the politi-
cal organisation of the state, the proper rights of the state,
while the latter exclusively affects rights other than those of
the state. The fact that the reasons of sentiment which
prompted the offender to commit the offense belong to the
realm of politics does not itself create a political offense."0
The major utility of this test is that it prevents a fugitive from
using a possible political motivation to escape punishment for an other-
wise common crime.5 This rather narrow definition, however, still ex-
cludes those political offenders who sincerely want political change but
whose actions do not affect the state directly.52
Another well developed approach is the Swiss "political motiva-
tary Extradition Treaty, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 755, 759 (1986); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3181 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (listing countries with which the United States has
extradition treaties).
7 See Note, supra note 30, at 624-32; Note, supra note 41, at 1009-11; see also
Gilbert, supra note 30, at 697 (Gilbert divides one of the approaches so he concludes
that there are actually four separate approaches).
48 S. Jur. II 44 (Cours d'appel, Grenoble 1947), 14 Ann. Dig. 145 (Ct. App.
Grenoble, Fr. 1947).
"I Id. at 44, 14 Ann. Dig. at 145; see also Gilbert, supra note 30, at 700 ("This is
a very strict interpretation of the exemption, only conferring asylum on those offenders
whose crimes affected the State alone and in no way harmed individuals-espionage,
sedition or lPse majestg would fall within the test, but not murder of the Head of State
with the aim of seizing power.").
50 S. Jur. II at 45, 14 Ann. Dig. at 145.
51 See Note, supra note 30, at 629-30. For a survey of the most recent French
applications of the doctrine see Carbonneau, The Political Offense Exception as Ap-
plied in French Cases Dealing with the Extradition of Terrorists: The Quest for an
Appropriate Doctrinal Analysis Revisted, in TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 209 (MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1983).
52 For example, a person who planted an explosive in front of a government
building would not pass this test despite her political motivation if, in fact, the explosive
injured innocent bystanders.
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tion" test.53 This test balances the political and common elements of the
crime. Only if the political element dominates is the fugitive not extra-
ditable.54 The balancing test was explained in the Swiss case of In re
Nappi:
5 5
[T]he political character of an offence is predominant only if
the offence is in direct relation to the end sought. In order
that such a relation may exist, the offence must be a really
efficacious method of achieving the end, or constitute an inte-
gral part of acts leading thereto, or represent an incident in a
general political movement in which the parties have re-
course to such methods.56
The British and American Courts have not followed the French or
Swiss but instead have developed their own test, the so-called "political
incidence" test." This test was first employed by the British House of
Lords in the case of In re Castioni.58 The fugitive being sought in that
case was a Swiss national who had fled to England after leading an
attack on a local cantonal government. During the attack, Castioni al-
legedly killed a member of that government. 59 The Swiss request for
his extradition was denied by the British court because the Lords found
that Castioni's actions were political.6" They stated the relevant test as
being "whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was acting as
one of a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political
character with a political object, and as part of the political movement
and rising in which he was taking part."6 The Lords held that:
[I]t must at least be shewn that the act is done in furtherance
See Gilbert, supra note 30, at 701 (noting that "the Swiss approach is the most
developed . . . and is widely accepted by academic writers"); Note, supra note 30, at
630.
"' See Gilbert, supra note 30, at 701-02 ("If the crime is violent then the common
element will outweigh the political motive unless such violence is the only means of
achieving the end."); Note, supra note 30, at 630-31 (the test is met only if "the politi-
cal objective predominate[s] over the common crime"); Note, supra note 41, at 1011
(The Swiss test's "flexible mechanism for balancing objective and subjective factors is
uniquely tailored to assist courts in assessing relative political acts.").
51 78 ATF 123 (Tribunal f~dfral 1952), 19 I.L.R. 375 (Switz. Fed. Tribunal
1952).
56 Id. at 376.
"' See In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 274-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Banoff & Pyle,
supra note 20, at 183-88 (also referring to this test as "the uprising test."); Gilbert,
supra note 30, at 697-98; Lubet, supra note 30, at 261-66; Note, supra note 30, at
624-29.
58 [18911 1 Q.B. 149 (1890).
59 Id. at 150.
60 Id. at 159.
61 Id.
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of, done with the intention of assistance, as a sort of overt act
in the course of acting in a political matter, a political rising,
or a dispute between two parties in the State as to which is
to have the government in its hands .... "
The Court thus established a two-part test. This test requires that
(1) the act be committed during an uprising, including a group of
which the accused is a member, and (2) that the act be one of political
violence committed by the accused for a political end."3 The political
end was later defined as the furtherance of a conflict between different
parties contending for power in a state."
United States courts first adopted the Castioni political incidence
test in the 1894 case of In re Ezeta. 5 The accused, Ezeta, had disposed
of the Salvadorian government before he was overthrown in a subse-
quent revolution. The new government wanted to try him on charges of
murder and robbery. The American court refused to extradite him on
the grounds that Ezeta's acts brought him under the protection of the
political offense exception.66 The court's conclusion, arrived at through
a mechanical application of the Castioni test, was inevitable, as Ezeta's
acts took place incidental to a violent insurrection."
American courts continued to apply the Castioni test rigidly, re-
gardless of the reasonableness of the result.6 8 For example, in United
States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic,69 the district court blocked the
extradition of a Yugoslavian war criminal because the mass murder he
was accused of committing occurred during, and in furtherance of, an
armed struggle between Serbs and Croats in pro-Nazi Croatia.7 1 Crit-
ics have argued that war criminals should not be protected by the ex-
ception no matter how "political" their acts."
62 Id. at 156.
'1 Id.; see Note, supra note 30, at 625.
See In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415, 419 (Cave, J.).
65 62 F. 972, 995-99 (N.D. Cal. 1894); see Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 183-
84 (political incidence test first adopted by American courts in Ezeta shortly after Cas-
tioni decision); Note, supra note 30, at 625 & n.50 (same).
68 See Ezeta, 62 F. at 999.
87 See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 183 (noting that Ezeta's acts helped over-
throw a previous political regime).
68 See, e.g., Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 510-12 (1896) (political offense excep-
tion applied to civilians who, as part of a group of 140 men, attacked 40 Mexican
soldiers, killing some, burned, looted, and stole money and horses, and assaulted civil-
ians); Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 184 ("Subsequent American cases have contin-
ued to apply the Ezeta-Castioni uprising test mechanically, whether or not the result is
reasonable.").
68 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
70 Id. at 392-93.
71 See, e.g., Lubet & Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extra-
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The most severe criticism of the American judiciary's application
of the political incidence test, however, has occurred as the result of
recent cases dealing with international terrorists.7 2 In the first of these
cases, In re McMullen," the magistrate refused to extradite a fugitive
PIRA member for his bombing of a British army barracks in England.
Similarly, in the case of In re Mackin,74 a court of appeals affirmed a
magistrates refusal to extradite a PIRA member for allegedly killing a
plain-clothes British policeman on a street corner in Belfast.7" And fi-
nally, in In re Doherty,7 a PIRA member was found to be nonex-
traditable because his alleged killing of a British army captain during
an ambush was covered by the political offense exception.""
These decisions outraged the British government, which main-
tained that such refusals to extradite amounted to an American sanction
of PIRA violence ." But regardless of the result, those cases were prop-
erly decided under the provisions of the treaty.
Despite the decisions, in McMullen, Mackin, and Doherty, Ameri-
can courts have demonstrated an unwillingness to allow the political
incidence test to shield all fugitive terrorists in the United States. In
Eain v. Wilkes, 79 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a federal magistrate's
decision to certify for extradition a Palestinian accused of killing two
Jewish children by placing a bomb in a crowded Israeli marketplace.8s
The court reasoned that Eain's action was not an offense of a political
character because it was an indiscriminate bombing." While acknowl-
edging that Eain's act had a political objective and was connected to an
armed political struggle,8 2 the court concluded that the bombing was
not "incidental" to the conflict.8" This subjective interpretation of the
dition of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 206-07 (1980).
72 See Hearings, supra note 2, at 4 (Statement of Judge Abraham Sofaer) (In
expressing his displeasure regarding the judiciary's application of the political offense
exception, Judge Sofaer queried "do we ... want our country to serve as a sanctuary
for terrorists who attack democratic governments?").
•' Mag. No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979), reprinted in 132
CONG. REC. S9146 (daily ed. 1986).
74 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
75 Id. at 137.
8 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
" Id. at 277.
7 See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 185. ("[T]he invocation of the uprising
test was offensive to a most friendly nation and threatened to undermine Britain's will-
ingness to surrender fugitives sought by the United States.").
1 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
80 Id. at 523-24.
1 See id. at 520-21.
82 The court noted that the armed struggle of the PLO is to create a Palestinian
homeland. See id. at 520 n.19.
83 Id. at 520.
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incidence test exposes the weakness of that test: in its strictest applica-
tion, the test can be either overinclusive or underinclusive. For exam-
ple, the test could exempt from extradition all crimes occurring during
a political disturbance, but no offense that was not contemporaneous
with an uprising.8 The Eain court tried to circumvent this problem by
creating a "wanton crimes" exception to the political incidence test.
Under this new exception, a fugitive could be extradited for killing ci-
vilians, even if the act satisfied the two-part incidence test. 5 The prob-
lem with the "wanton crimes" exception, however, is that it complicates
the political offense standard by allowing judges to make subjective
judgments about foreign terrorist groups and their methods.
A more recent case demonstrating flexibility in the application of
the political incidence test is Quinn v. Robinson.86 In Quinn, the fugi-
tive being sought for extradition allegedly conspired to cause explosions
in London and was also suspected of participating in the murder of a
British police constabl. 87 The federal magistrate found Quinn extra-
ditable but the district court reversed on appeal.88 The Ninth Circuit
reinstated the magistrate's finding, holding that Quinn was not pro-
tected by the political offense exception.89 The Ninth Circuit rejected
the Eain court's "wanton crimes" exception to the incidence test and
adopted its own standard for determining extraditability. 90 The Ninth
Circuit explicitly rejected the notion that any "international terrorist"
could claim the benefit of the political offense exception.9" The court
held that because there was no "uprising" in England, Quinn's acts
could not have been in furtherance of a political revolt.9 2 The court
placed great emphasis on the principle that the term "uprising," for the
purpose of the political incidence test, meant an uprising in the imme-
diate geographic vicinity of where the act of violence occurred. In
Quinn, the uprising was in Northern Ireland, not England, and there-
84 See I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 180-81.
83 See Eain, 641 F.2d at 520.
86 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986).
87 Id. at 783-84.
8 Id. at 785-86.
88 Id. at 817-18.
11 See id. at 808 ("interpreting the political offense exception in light of its his-
toric origins and goals"). For a more detailed discussion of the Quinn decision, see
Note, A Sewing Lesson in Political Offense Determinations: Stitching-Up the Interna-
tional Terrorist's Loophole, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 499, 513-20
(1987).
11 See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 805 ("The desire to exclude international terrorists
from the coverage of the political offense exception is a legitimate one ... .
92 Id. at 806-08, 813.
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fore Quinn's act did not satisfy the first prong of the political incidence
test.93
Although it claimed to be correctly applying the traditional inci-
dence test, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Quinn demonstrates a depar-
ture from that test. Since Northern Ireland is governed directly from
London, the capital of the United Kingdom,94 logic dictates that a
group employing violence for political change would commit acts in
that capital. The Quinn court appears to be guilty of the same subjec-
tive interpretation of the political incidence test as the Eain court, be-
cause it manipulated the test so as to exclude a particular group that it
disfavored.
In addition to the somewhat inconsistent application of the politi-
cal incidence test, United States courts have differed in adhering to the
so-called "rule of non-inquiry."95 According to this rule, American
courts should not examine the political motivations of the requesting
government in extradition proceedings. The ',,new Supplementary
Treaty has modified both the political incidence test and the rule of
non-inquiry.
II. THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY: FACIAL CONCERNS
A. Overview
The Supplementary Treaty radically alters the role that federal
magistrates and judges play in the extradition process. The heart of the
Supplementary Treaty is article 1. This article explicitly excludes a
wide variety of crimes from the scope of the political offense excep-
tion.9" Subpart (a) of the article excludes from the category of political
offense certain crimes listed in multinational conventions whose signa-
tories include both the United States and the United Kingdom. These
treaties in themselves do not exclude the operation of the political of-
fense exception for the enumerated crimes. But now, under the Supple-
mentary Treaty, a fugitive suspected of committing an offense in viola-
tion of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft,97 or the International Convention Against the Taking of Hos-
93 See id. at 813 ("The magistrate correctly concluded that there was an uprising
in Northern Ireland at the time of the offenses .... We cannot conclude, however,
that the uprising extended to England.").
9 Northern Ireland's Parliament was suspended in 1972. See id. at 812.
" See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20, at 190.
Supplementary Treaty, supra note 7, art. 1. For further discussions of the
scope of art. 1 see Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political Offense Exception to
Extradition, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 118-20 (1986); Note, supra note 46,
at 778-82.
' Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
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tages,"8 is barred automatically from the protection of the political of-
fense exception, regardless of the political nature of the crime.
Subpart (b) excludes serious violent crimes against the person, in-
cluding murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous
bodily harm."' Again, there is no distinction made for the offender
whose acts are politically motivated.
Subparts (c), (d), and (e) exclude kidnapping, the taking of hos-
tages, the use of any incendiary device, and participation as an accom-
plice in any article 1 act. 10 Moreover, even the mere attempt to commit
one of these acts precludes the exception. Article 1 in effect removes
from judicial consideration the applicability of the political offense doc-
trine with regard to the nature of the act committed. 01 The commission
of almost any violent act, regardiess of motivation, will bar the invoca-
tion of the political offense exception.
B. Criticisms of the Erosion of the Political
Offense Exception
Critics of this provision argue that the United States is in effect
being enlisted by the United Kingdom as an ally in its internal struggle
against the PIRA.1 °2 As evidence of this charge, critics point out that
there is currently no controversy between the United States and the
United Kingdom regarding the extradition of terrorists to the United
States.1 0 3 They argue that the interests of the United States are ade-
quately protected by the existing treaty because no alleged U.S. ter-
rorists have claimed the benefit of the political offense exception in
U.K. courts.10 4 What this criticism overlooks, however, is the fact that
both countries feel threatened by terrorism and believe that it is in their
common interest to suppress it. 05
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force Oct.
14, 1971).
98 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Conven-
tion Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
39) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/34/PV 105 (1980) (entered into force June 3, 1983) [hereinaf-
ter International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages].
"' Supplementary Treaty, supra note 7, art. 1(b).
100 Id. art. 1(c), (d).
101 Id.
102 See Hearings, supra note 2, at 281 (statement of Cherif Bassiouni) ("The
purpose of the Supplementary Treaty is to assist Great Britain in quelling Irish Armed
resistance. It is essentially an anti-IRA Treaty ... .
103 See id. at 282.
104 See id. at 281-82 ("[T]he Supplementary Treaty does not, on the basis of ex-
isting and past experience, benefit the U.S .... ").
105 See id. at 2 (statement of Judge Abraham Sofaer) ("Terrorism ... is rampant
in the world today, and we are a favorite target. . . . This is a treaty that all Ameri-
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Another, perhaps more legitimate, criticism is that the Supplemen-
tary Treaty is overinclusive in that it exempts all violent acts from the
protection of the political offense exception.' Thus, not only are ter-
rorists denied the benefit of the exception, but rebels who do not em-
ploy violence against civilians are also denied the exception.'0 7 In other
words, violent acts against civilians are put on the same level as attacks
against police and military personnel. The treaty denies the legitimacy
of violent opposition to the political status quo and forces political dissi-
dents to fight for change through the existing political structure. Critics
point out that many of the "Founding Fathers" of the United States
employed violent tactics in their struggle against British colonial rule,
and Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty in effect delegitimizes their
actions.'0 8 Violence, it is urged, is sometimes a legitimate means to es-
tablish or reestablish certain moral, cultural, and religious values.'0 9
The drawback of this criticism, however, is that it must reach far back
in history to find its rationale. Both the United Kingdom and the
United States were very different political entities during the revolu-
tionary period than they are today. The two countries currently are
among the most advanced democracies in the world, and it is difficult to
imagine circumstances under which political violence in either country
would need to be employed. It is by no means certain, however, that
such circumstances will not occur sometime in the future. Moreover,
the type of rebels who fought against British colonial rule 200 years
ago were a far cry from many of today's international terrorists.'
Rather than fighting for traditional democratic values, today's terrorists
are almost uniformly fighting to impose a totalitarian ideology on the
cans should enthusiastically support.").
... See id. at 228 (statement of Arthur Helton); id. at 231 (statement of David
Carliner, Esq.).
107 See id. at 310 (statement of Charles Rice); see also Note, The Political Offense
Exception: Is the United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty
the Beginning of the End?, 2 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 203, 225-27 (1987) (arguing
that article 1 sweeps too broadly and that only those terrorists committing "interna-
tional" crimes should be denied the benefit of the political offense exception).
10 See 132 CONG. Rac. S9161 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Helms).
109 See id. at S9162.
11 See C. STERLING, THE TERROR NETWORK 151-52 (1981); see also Hearings,
supra note 2, at 2 (statement of Judge Abraham Sofaer) ("They believe in bullets and
bombs. We believe in rule by majority and they believe in rule by terror."); Baker, The
Western European Legal Response to Terrorism, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 1, 1
(1987) ("In describing himself as an evil spirit which moves around only at night caus-
ing constant nightmares, [the Palestinian Abu] Nidal personifies the reality of terrorism
. ... "); Friedlander, Terrorism and International Law: Recent Developments, 13
RUTGERS L.J. 493, 511 (1982).
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states within which they operate. 1 ' Because the original purpose of the
political offense exception was to protect democratic revolutionaries, it
would seem contradictory to allow the exception to be used by those
trying to destroy what those democrats created.1 2
Also associated with the overbreadth argument is the criticism that
the traditional role of the judiciary in extradition has been usurped and
the process has now become too politicized.113 Since there has been no
agreement on a general definition of "political offense,"114 the reason-
ing goes, it is best left to the judiciary to make that determination on a
case-by-case basis. Under the Supplementary Treaty, once a violent of-
fense is committed, the extraditability of the accused will turn on the
definition of "political offense" adopted by the incumbent executive ad-
ministration.115 Whereas in the past the judiciary could establish crite-
ria for determining the scope of the exception based on a concern for
the accused, the executive can now make that decision on the basis of
political expediency.11 Such a practice could subject the executive
branch of government to criticism and possible embarrassment regard-
ing its extradition policy.117
C. Procedural Protections
Despite the severe limitations that article 1 places on federal
judges, article 3 of the Supplementary Treaty does allow the judiciary
some discretion in certifying alleged political criminals for extradition.
"' See Hearings, supra note 2, at 2 (statement of Judge Abraham Sofaer); C.
STERLING, supra note 110, at 151; Baker, supra note 110, at 10.
12 See I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 11-21; C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra
note 34, at 9. The modern concept of the political offense exception had its beginnings
during the revolutionary period in Europe in the late eighteenth century. The French
Republican Constitution, for example, had a provision granting asylum to individuals
"banished from their countries for the cause of Freedom").
I's See Note, supra note 30, at 641-43. But see Comment, The United States-
United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty: Limiting Availability of the "Po-
litical Crime" Defense, 9 Hous. J. INT'L L. 303, 328 (allowing the executive to make
"the threshold decision that the requesting state is a democracy with an equitable legal
system" is a positive development).
114 See id. at 637. For a more detailed discussion regarding the definitional
problems of terrorism, see Baker, supra note 110, at 1-2; Bassiouni, Prolegomenon to
Terror Violence, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 745, 751 (1979) ("[E]fforts to define terror-
ism have met with the resistance of those who, in the absence of a common basis of
ideology, prefer the ambiguity of an undefined term.").
115 See Hearings, supra note 2, at 315-16 (statement of Charles Rice).
116 See Lubet, supra note 30, at 280-81.
111 See id. at 285. ("The determination of the political offense issue by a neutral
and judicial forum, however, actually might diminish the possibility of embarrassment
to the government in the conduct of foreign affairs.").
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The first clause in article 3, the so-called "Aquino,""'  or
"trumped up charge" clause, was inserted to prevent an otherwise in-
nocent fugitive from being extradited simply because the requesting
state had been able to make a showing of probable cause based upon
false charges.119 The second clause asserts that even if legitimate proba-
ble cause is shown, extradition can be denied upon a finding that the
accused will be prejudiced at her trial for the reasons stated in the
article.' °
The actual meaning of the second clause in article 3 has been a
controversial issue, because it alters the traditional principle of non-
inquiry that prohibits the courts of the United States from examining
the fairness of another country's legal system.' One interpretation of
the clause is that a fugitive could defeat extradition only if she proves
that she "would" be prejudiced at trial, or punished, detained, or re-
stricted in her personal liberty.' 22 This interpretation would place a
significant evidentiary burden on the fugitive.' 3 Senator Eagleton, 124
for example, interprets article 3(a) as reflecting positively on the fair-
ness of the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. He believes
that both countries would not have gone through the trouble of exempt-
ing certain serious crimes from the political offense exception, only to
allow a federal court to defeat an extradition request by finding the
system of criminal justice in Northern Ireland unfair.' Senator
Eagleton believes that article 3(a) is only a narrow limitation on article
"' Benigno Aquino, the former Phillippine opposition leader, was assassinated in
1983. See Marcos Foe Slain As He Goes Home From Exile In U.S., N.Y. Times, Aug.
22, 1983, at Al, col. 6, While Aquino was in exile in the U.S., the Phillippine govern-
ment requested his extradition to face what were believed to be the false charges of
plotting to cause explosions in Manila. See 132 CONG. REC. S9253 (daily ed. July 17,
1986) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (referring to the "Ninoy Aquino test" as a means of
avoiding extradition when the request is based on "trumped-up charges" or when the
defendant cannot get a fair trial in the requesting state); Manila Reviving Charges
Against Opposition Leader, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1980, at 8A, col. 3.
119 See 132 CONG. REC. S9167 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Eagleton).
120 See id. at S9253 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
121 See id. at S9260-61 (statement of Sen. Biden); Banoff & Pyle, supra note 20,
at 188-90 (discussing the origin of the non-inquiry rule and its effects).
122 See 132 CONG. REC. S9167 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Eagleton).
123 See id.
124 Senator Eagleton has identified himself as the author of article 3(a). See id. In
a later debate, Senator Eagleton demanded that the Senate take a hard line against all
terrorists, asserting that "[tihey are all terrorists; that is what they are. Terrorism is the
same whether you have a swarthy complexion and talk in Arabic or whether you have
pink cheeks and talk with a brogue." Id. S9252 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Eagleton).
125 See id. S9167 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Eagleton).
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1, which allows a fugitive to defeat extradition only if she proves the
charges against her are a sham or that she will be individually perse-
cuted."2 6 The Senator also believes that article 3(a) leaves intact the
rule of non-inquiry because a judge cannot pass judgment on the fair-
ness of the foreign criminal justice system as a whole.
127
The view taken by other members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee would allow a judge's scrutiny of the fairness of the foreign
judicial system and a denial of extradition if the judge found that the
criminal process was fundamentally unfair. 2 ' This interpretation of
the Supplementary Treaty presents a problem because the fairness of
the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland has been seriously
questioned.' 29 Several pieces of emergency anti-terrorist legislation have
been enacted in Northern Ireland, and some have extended to the
United Kingdom as a whole. This legislation has curtailed severely the
normal procedural safeguards given to criminal defendants. 30 If this
latter, more expansive view is adopted by federal judges, these judges
will have to inquire into the criminal justice system of Northern Ire-
land once a fugitive presents evidence that she will not receive a fair
trial.' 31
III. THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY: PROBLEMS OF APPLICATION
The Supplementary Treaty does not exist in a legal or political
vacuum. Its practical effects will have serious consequences because of
both what it says and what it does not say. Judges deciding on extradi-
tion requests may have to scrutinize closely the legal system in North-
ern Ireland. They may also have to contend with arguments that the
Supplementary Treaty violates defendants' rights through its retroactive
application. Meanwhile, the United States government will undoubt-
edly face requests for similar extradition arrangements from govern-
ments considered much less democratic than Great Britain's. This Part
analyzes these problems, which are likely to arise in the application of
the Supplementary Treaty.
126 See id.
127 See id. In Senator Eagleton's view, "[a] court may not deny extradition be-
cause it concludes that a foreign tribunal does not provide every procedural safeguard
provided by U.S. courts." Id.
121 See id. at S9253 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
S129 See id. (Sen. Kerry likening Northern Ireland's justice system to that of the
Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos). For a more general discussion of European
anti-terrorist legislation see Baker, supra note 110, at 10-22.
120 See infra notes 142-72 and accompanying text.
131 But see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
1988]
1532 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
A. The Northern Ireland Criminal Justice System
It is important for federal judges to understand the many ques-
tionable practices inherent in the Northern Irish judicial system, be-
cause a fugitive may not get a fair trial in Northern Irish courts. In
order to understand the current criminal justice process in Northern
Ireland, it must be viewed in the context of the political situation in
that province.
Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom. It was created
in 1921 after the British Parliament granted independence to twenty-
six of Ireland's thirty-two counties. 132 The majority of the population
in the six predominantly Protestant northern counties wanted to remain
a part of the United Kingdom. Those six counties formed the basis of
the new British province of Northern Ireland. 3 ' Since its inception,
this entity has been controlled by a Protestant majority that has exer-
cised power to the detriment of the Roman Catholic minority. 34 Prot-
estant retaliation against Catholic civil rights activists resulted in the
creation of a pro-Catholic paramilitary organization known as the Pro-
visional IRA ("PIRA") in 1969. The PIRA was a splinter group from
another organization known as the "Official IRA." The Official IRA
advocated the withdrawal of Britain from Northern Ireland and the
unification of the Province with the twenty-six-county Republic of Ire-
land. The split in the IRA resulted because the faction that became the
PIRA advocated the use of force, while the other faction sought its
goals through peaceful means.1 3
The PIRA seeks to cause an atmosphere of such fear and violence
in Northern Ireland that it will become impossible for Britain to govern
that province.136 The PIRA hopes that the chaos it creates will precipi-
tate a general uprising that will lead to the unification of Ireland."'7
132 See J. DARBY, CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 48-49 (1976); THE Di-
VIDED PROVINCE 6, 21 (K. Jeffery ed. 1985); R. ROSE, NORTHERN IRELAND: TIME
OF CHOICE 3 (1976).
133 See THE DIVIDED PROVINCE, supra note 132, at 6, 20; M. FARRELL,
NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE 22 (2d ed. 1980); R. ROSE, supra note
132, at 3.
134 See THE DIVIDED PROVINCE, supra note 132, at 23; R. ROSE, supra note
132, at 12-14.
135 See W. FLACKES, NORTHERN IRELAND: A POLITICAL DIRECTORY 163-66,
184-96 (1980); C. STERLING, supra note 110, at 152.
131 See T. COOGAN, THE I.R.A. 470 (1980) ("The ultimate object of the cam-
paign. . . [was] to render the existing state inoperable so that the army would have to
withdraw."); THE DIVIDED PROVINCE, supra note 132, at 50 (stating the PIRA objec-
tive of forcing British withdrawal by armed action); C. STERLING, supra note 110, at
162-63 (discussing the PIRA goal of general suffering as a prelude to change).
137 See C. STERLING, supra note 110, at 162.
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The strategy of the PIRA has included the bombing of civilians13 as
well as attacks upon the Northern Ireland security forces.13
Faced with rising violence from the PIRA as well as other extrem-
ist, pro-unionist paramilitary groups,1 40 the British government dis-
solved the Northern Irish Parliament in 1972 and ruled the province
directly from London.1 41 Along with imposing this direct rule, the Brit-
ish Parliament enacted several pieces of legislation that radically altered
the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland in an effort to better
combat terrorism there. The two laws that most significantly affect the
rights of the accused in terrorist cases are the Northern Ireland (Emer-
gency Provisions) Act of 1978 ("EPA") 142 and the Prevention of Ter-
rorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1984 ("PTA"). 43
The EPA consolidates several earlier statutes that were enacted
pursuant to a 1972 report to the British government on security
problems in Northern Ireland. This report recommended that the Prov-
ince's legal system be altered in order to deal better with increasing
terrorist activity.1 44 The EPA applies only to Northern Ireland. 145 The
PTA, also enacted to combat terrorism, applies throughout the entire
United Kingdom.146 The EPA must be reviewed by the British Parlia-
128 See T. COOGAN, supra note 136, at 478-79 (Statistical study reported 1341
civilian deaths as of 1980 from political violence in Northern Ireland.); THE DIVIDED
PROVINCE, supra note 132, at 56, 73 (theory behind bombings); C. STERLING, supra
note 110, at 164-65, 298 (examples of PIRA bomb attacks on civilians); see also In re
Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (PIRA and loyalist violence "be-
tween 1972 and 1979 claimed the lives of over 1,770 persons, nearly 1,300 of whom
were civilian casualties and injured hundreds of others.").
19 See, e.g., Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783-85 (9th Cir. 1986) (describ-
ing six PIRA letter-bomb attacks on officials in England); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122,
124 (2d Cir. 1981) (considering extradition of PIRA members who had entered the
United States illegally while on bail on charges of the attempted murder of a British
soldier); Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (considering extradition of
PIRA member who admitted ambushing British troops and killing a soldier); M. FAR-
RELL, supra note 133, at 279 (describing an example of the "conventional military
action" that took place).
140 See, K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN
IRELAND 19-22 (1980); W. FLACKES, supra note 135, at 229-33, 242-45 (discussing
violent activity of the Unionist Ulster Defense Association and Ulster Volunteer Force).
141 See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 812; J. DARBY, supra note 132, at 25; R. ROSE,
supra note 132, at 27.
142 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5. The first version of
the EPA was enacted in 1973. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, ch.
53.
141 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, ch. 8.
144 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO
DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, CMND. SER. 5,
No. 5185 (Lord Diplock, Chairman) [hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORT].
148 See Emergency Provisions Act, 1978, Preliminary Note.
148 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, Preliminary Note.
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ment every six months, 147 and the PTA must be reviewed every twelve
months.
1 48
The EPA makes membership in certain paramilitary organizations
a crime. 149 In addition, merely behaving in public "like a member of a
proscribed organization" carries a criminal penalty.1 50 Moreover, the
EPA outlaws the gathering of information that might be useful to ter-
rorist groups regarding individual police officers, soldiers, judges, and
prison employees. It also outlaws training other persons in the use of
firearms and explosives. 51 The EPA places limits upon an individual's
freedom of speech. It prohibits solicitation of support for proscribed or-
ganizations1 52 and it gives the security forces the power to disperse as-
semblies. 15 The PTA does not deal with matters of speech and assem-
bly. The PTA creates crimes similar to those in the EPA, except that
the proscriptions in the PTA apply throughout the entire United
Kingdom."
Both acts give the police extensive authority to detain suspected
terrorists without charge for long periods of time. The EPA allows a
"constable," defined as a member of either civilian or military police,1 55
to arrest any person "suspect[ed] of being a terrorist" and to hold that
person for up to seventy-two hours.' 51 In addition, the military can ar-
rest a person upon mere suspicion and hold her for an unspecified pe-
riod.1  The PTA allows the police to exercise broad powers of arrest
anywhere in the United Kingdom. It allows the police to arrest anyone
they have "reasonable grounds" to suspect of being "concerned in the
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism" connected
with Northern Ireland, and to hold that person for up to forty-eight
hours. 5
Both acts allow the police and the army to conduct broad-ranging
'4 Emergency Provisions Act, § 33.
148 Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 17.
149 Emergency Provisions Act, § 21 & Sched. 2. In addition to the Irish Republi-
can Army and several more obscure Nationalist Catholic organizations, the proscribed
groups include the Unionist (Protestant) Red Hand Commando, Ulster Freedom
Fighters, and Ulster Volunteer Force. Id.
150 Id. § 36(2).
151 Id. § 25.
152 Id. § 21.
153 Id. § 24.
154 Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 12.
155 Emergency Provisions Act, § 11 & notes.
1 Id.
'5 Id. § 14. The Diplock Report recommended that police be given the authority
to detain any person on suspicion "for a period of not more than four hours for the
purpose of establishing his identity." DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 144, at 21.
158 Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 12. The PTA definition of "constable" omits
reference to the Royal Naval, Military, and Air Force Police. Id. § 2 & notes.
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searches. Under the EPA, officials can enter "any premises or other
place other than a dwelling house" to search for munitions or transmit-
ters. This authority is subject only to the limitation that the officials
must have "suspicion" before they can conduct such a search.1' The
security forces may also enter any premises when necessary "for the
preservation of the peace or the maintenance of order.
160
Under the PTA, however, the power of the authorities to search
and seize is much more limited. The Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland must give authorization to officials before they may board sea-
going vessels to determine whether persons entering or leaving the
United Kingdom have been involved in the commission, preparation, or
instigation of an act of terrorism. 61
The EPA extends the authority of officials to detain suspected ter-
rorists before trial. The "EPA removes the power to grant bail from
magistrates and justices of the peace and makes it available only upon
application to a High Court judge."'16 2 Threats, intimidation, and ac-
tual violence against court officers necessitated this reform. 3 The EPA
also shifts to the accused the burden of satisfying the high court judge
that he has met the requirements for bail. In England, the burden is
ordinarily on the prosecution."6
The EPA eliminates the right to a jury trial for those charged
with committing enumerated terrorist offenses.'6 Under the EPA, sus-
pected terrorists are tried by so-called "Diplock" courts. These courts
are named after the British L6rd Diplock, who, in a 1972 report, rec-
ommended that a special type of criminal court be created in order to
better combat terrorism.'66 A trial is potentially within the jurisdiction
of the Diplock courts if any charge against the defendant is one of a
specified set of common law offenses characteristic of terrorism and
listed in the EPA. 67 Such offenses include murder, kidnapping, as-
sault, conspiracy, crimes involving firearms or explosives, arson, and
aggravated burglary." 8
159 Emergency Provisions Act, § 15(I).
160 Id. § 19.
101 Prevention of Terrorism Act, §§ 13(1)(a)(i), (2)(b).
162 Emergency Provisions Act, § 12; see Hearings, supra note 2, at 558 (re-
sponses of Judge Abraham Sofaer to questions from Sen. Dodd).
161 See DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 144, at 14-16.
6 See id. at 23-24.
165 Emergency Provisions Act, § 7(1) (a trial on "indictment of a scheduled of-
fense shall be conducted by a court without a jury"); see DIPLocK REPORT, supra note
144, at 40-42 (recommending use of trial without a jury for listed schedule of offenses).
166 See DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 144, at 17-19.
167 Emergency Provisions Act, § 30 & Sched. 4.
168 Id.
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The British government created this regime in the belief that the
jury system in Northern Ireland "was in danger of a complete break-
down."' 69 Reports of terrorists intimidating juries and threatening re-
taliation for "bad" jury verdicts spurred Parliament to revamp the
manner in which the criminal justice system processed suspected ter-
rorists. Whether or not these reports were true, the perception of their
truth may have been sufficient to prompt passage of the law. As Lord
Diplock observed, a "frightened juror is a bad juror even though his
own safety and that of his family may not actually be at risk."17
Moreover, there was a concern that the verdicts that juries delivered
were often determined by the politics and religion of the accused. For
example, Protestant juries tended to convict IRA defendants at a much
higher rate than they convict Unionist defendants.17" '
Despite the lack of a jury, the Diplock system provides several
procedural safeguards. The judge in a Diplock court must state the
basis for her verdict in writing. Her findings of both fact and law can
be reviewed on appeal.'1 2 The result of such safeguards has been that
acquittal rates for defendants in Diplock courts tend to be about the
same as for those in ordinary criminal trials in Northern Ireland.17 3
In Northern Ireland, unlike in England, an application for legal
aid must be granted unless the defendant is found to have sufficient
financial means to obtain her own counsel. In England, a defendant is
only guaranteed counsel when she is accused of murder or when the
prosecution takes an appeal.' 74
In addition to criticisms of its criminal process, Britain has also
come under fire for its officials' treatment of suspects and convicts in
their custody. In 1971, the government of the Republic of Ireland filed
a complaint with the European Commission on Human Rights alleging
that the British had violated article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The complaint alleged that British authorities brutal-
ized subjected pretrial detainees during interrogation.7 In 1978, the
169 132 CONG. REC. S9170 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lugar)
(incorporating analysis of Diplock courts prepared by the State Department).
170 DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 144, at 17.
171 See id.
172 Emergency Provisions Act, § 7(5), (6); see DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 144,
at 18.
171 In 1984, 53% of all nonjury trials ended with the acquittal of the defendant.
See Hearings, supra note 2, at 13 (testimony of Judge Abraham Sofaer).
11" See Hearings, supra note 2, at 558-59 (responses of Judge Abraham Sofaer to
questions from Sen. Dodd).
175 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, no. 2889, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Article III provides: "No one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id.,
art. III.
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European Court of Human Rights found that the techniques consti-
tuted inhuman and degrading treatment, but not torture.170
In 1977, Amnesty International investigated complaints that sus-
pects were being mistreated while in the custody of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary ("RUC"), the Northern Ireland police force. 77 The Brit-
ish responded to the investigation by establishing a commission that
eventually recommended changes in the interrogation methods used by
the RUC. 7 8
These facts about the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland
raise questions as to whether that system is fair enough to allow the
United States to return fugitives and have confidence that those fugi-
tives will be treated justly.' In order to determine the reasonableness
and fairness of the Northern Irish judicial system, judges should bal-
ance the limited rights suspects enjoy under the EPA and the PTA
against the role that terrorist violence has played in altering Northern
Irish judicial procedures.1" Superficially, it is easy to look from a dis-
tance and criticize other countries for not adhering to the high stan-
dards of justice to which Western countries have grown accustomed.
The United Kingdom, however, is faced with a serious threat to its
internal security and believes that only extraordinary measures will
remedy that threat. Moreover, more than simply the future of Northern
Ireland is at stake. The PIRA has also declared war on the Republic of
Ireland and has made no secret of its desire to topple that democracy
and replace it with a less democratic regime.' 8 ' Interestingly enough,
the Republic of Ireland also employs special juryless courts to try sus-
17' See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 66-67 (1978) (five
interrogation techniques used by British violated article III).
17 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND (28 NOVEMBER-6 DECEMBER 1977) 2-4 (1978).
18 See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION
PROCEDURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1979 CMND. SER. 5, No. 7497, at 135-40 (rec-
ommending, inter alia, development of a code of conduct for interviewers, increased
involvement of medical officers in supervision of detainees, and increased access to solic-
itors during detention).
19 See supra notes 10, 118-31 and accompanying text.
180 Cf Hearings, supra note 2, at 18 (statement of Judge Abraham Sofaer) (com-
menting on the Diplock courts, that if the United States "had the kind of problem that
they have in Northern Ireland, [the U.S.] would be doing pretty well [to have] a system
as fair as the one they have").
'18 See C. STERLING, supra note 110, at 157 ("'Victory in the north means not
just defeat of the [Protestant] Loyalists and the unity of Ireland, but also the collapse of
the government in the south and an anti-imperialist revolution in that country.'"
(quoting Michael Farrell, Irish revolutionary, from 0. DEMARIS, L'INTERNATIONALE
TERRORISTE 365-66, 370 (1978))); see also O'Brien, Irish Terrorists and Extradition:
The Tuite Case, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 249, 254 n.22 (1983) (IRA advocates overthrow of
the Republic of Ireland); Comment, supra note 113, at 324 (IRA advocates unification
of the "entire island.").
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pected terrorists. 1 2 Thus, the Diplock courts are not merely a British
weapon against Irish nationalism.
Judge Sprizzo, in In re Doherty,"83 commented upon the fairness
of the British Diplock court system in Northern Ireland.' He specifi-
cally rejected the charge that the Diplock courts and the procedures
they employ are inherently unfair.' 85 Judge Sprizzo concluded "that
both Unionists and Republicans who commit offenses of a political
character can and do receive fair and impartial justice."' 86 Although he
violated the rule of non-inquiry,"8 " Judge Sprizzo's assertion made it
easier for senators opposed to the inclusion of article 3(a) in the Sup-
plementary Treaty to accept that provision because it indicated that,
under the standard set forth in 3(a), the Northern Irish judicial system
was fair. 8 8 It seemed hardly logical to enter into a new treaty that
allowed extradition by altering radically the scope of the political of-
fense exception only to allow judges to deny extradition based upon the
unfairness of the Northern Irish judicial system.
The Committee on Foreign Relations took special note of Judge
Sprizzo's dictum on the Diplock courts in its evaluation of the new
treaty. 89 Some in Congress, however, believe that his was not the last
word on that subject. 90 Judge Sprizzo, it is claimed, based his decision
upon the testimonial evidence of United States government witnesses
who were acting on behalf of the British government during Doherty's
extradition hearing. 9' The defendant, Doherty, did not and probably
could not have introduced any evidence to refute the government's
facts.' 92 Under the new treaty, fugitives will be allowed to introduce
evidence in order to establish the unfairness of the judicial system to
which they are being returned. Consequently, another federal judge de-
as8 Hearings, supra note 2, at 12-13 (statement of Judge Abraham Sofaer).
183 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
184 See id. at 276.
185 See id.
186 Id.
187 See supra text accompanying note 95.
188 See 132 CONG. REc. S9167 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Eagleton) ("I consider Judge Sprizzo's opinion, as it relates to the fairness
of the Diplock court system, as being conformative to our intent in fashioning article
3(a) . . ").
-18 See id. at 59254 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (reporting
the Committee's concern that fugitives sought for extradition have an opportunity to
challenge the fairness of the judicial system that would try them).
190 See id. (statement of Sen. Kerry) (noting first, that Judge Sprizzo's assessment
was based on one-sided testimony without provision for rebuttal, and second, that
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termining Doherty's extraditability under the Supplementary Treaty
might reach a conclusion different from that of Judge Sprizzo, based
upon evidence submitted by the fugitive.
B. Retroactivity
An important effect of the Supplementary Treaty is its retroactive
operation upon fugitives previously sought for extradition.193 Propo-
nents of the retroactivity clause see no unfairness in further attempts to
return a fugitive whose extradition was denied under the political of-
fense exception in an earlier proceeding.'" Their rationale is that the
acts committed by the fugitive are already criminal, so the retroactivity
clause would not impose any new punishment or create any new
crime.195 Rather, the Supplementary Treaty, in conformity with other
American extradition treaties, simply grants the requesting state an-
other opportunity to obtain the return of one of its nationals.
Those opposed to the retroactivity clause point out that it has an
effect similar to that of a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law.198 If
no new crime or punishment is involved, however, this criticism ap-
pears to be groundless. Indeed, the United States currently has twenty-
one extradition treaties with retroactivity clauses.19
A more pertinent objection is the lack of a res judicata effect aris-
ing from extradition proceedings; however, there is no provision in
United States extradition law requiring the application of res judicata
to extradition proceedings.19 " The Office of the Legal Adviser of the
"I See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 7, art. 5 (general retroactive applica-
tion of the treaty).
114 See 132 CONG. REC. S9156 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Lugar) (resisting the amendment, proposed by Senator D'Amato, that would bar retro-
active application of the Supplementary Treaty when extradition had been sought and
denied in a United States court).
19" See id. at S9154 (statement of Sen. Lugar) (noting that murder and attempted
murder are each proscribed by both the United States and the United Kingdom).
19I See id. at S9153 (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (objecting to the retroactive
eradication of the political offense exception and citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (the
bill of attainder/ex post facto clause)).
197 See id. at S9158 (reprinting a letter from Mary V. Mochary, Deputy Legal
Adviser of the United States Department of State, listing Austria, Iceland, Belguim,
Latvia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Congo (Bazzaville), Luxembourg, Cuba, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Rumania, Ecuador, San Marino, Estonia, France, Sweden, Switzerland, Gua-
temala, the United Kingdom, and Honduras as having retroactive supplementary extra-
dition treaties with the United States).
'99 See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1981); Hooker v. Klein, 573
F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978); Comment, The Turning
Point Approaches: The Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 549, 553 (1987); see also Note, supra note 46, at 766 n.50 (noting that Yugosla-
via has taken advantage of the fact that an extradition proceeding is not accorded res
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Department of State has said that United States policy will be to extra-
dite those fugitives previously given the benefit of the political offense
exception.199 Double jeopardy will not be an issue in the new proceed-
ing because that fifth amendment right does not attach until the trial
has actually begun.200 Thus, because an extradition hearing is more
like a pretrial proceeding than a trial, -the fugitive is not being tried
twice.2 ,
If the United Kingdom were again to request the extradition of
McMullen, Mackin, and Doherty, federal courts would have to
reevaluate their status under the terms of the Supplementary Treaty.
All three fugitives committed acts of violence against officers of the re-
questing state and would therefore be automatically barred from invok-
ing the political offense exception under article 1 of the Supplementary
Treaty. A court could declare one of the three nonextraditable only if
they found the fugitive nonextraditable under article 3(a). Ironically,
such a conclusion would probably outrage the British more than did the
decision not to extradite the three PIRA fugitives under the political
offense exception.
C. Double Standard
Another problem created by the Supplementary Treaty-which
will become even more pronounced if the United States concludes simi-
lar treaties with other liberal democracies" -is that it compels the use
judicata effect).
199 See Hearings, supra note 2, at 569 app. (responses of Judge Abraham Sofaer
to questions from Sen. Biden) (noting that the U.S. is appealing to reverse the denials
of Quinn and Doherty's extradition). Judge Sofaer's response renders the Administra-
tion's position somewhat perplexing with respect to Quinn and Doherty since a denial
of extradition was held to be not appealable in Mackin. See Mackin, 668 F.2d at 125-
30.
290 See Hooker, 573 F.2d at 1367 n.7; 132 CONG. REC. S9158 (daily ed. June 23,
1986) (letter from Mary V. Mochary, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State).
201 See Hooker, 573 F.2d at 1367 ("A finding of extradition. . . is truly an inter-
locutory order, more akin to a preliminary hearing on criminal charges [than to a final
judgment.]"); 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982) (The court's determination in extradition pro-
ceedings is only whether the evidence presented is "sufficient to sustain the charge
under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention . . ").
202 At the time of the completion of this Comment, the United States had just
enacted Supplementary Treaties with Belgium, signed at Washington, Mar. 17, 1987,
and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed Oct. 21, 1986. See Hearings, supra note
2, at 20 (statement of Judge Abraham Sofaer) (alluding to the negotiation of these
treaties).
For a more detailed discussion of the problems of adjusting extradition treaties on
a country-by-country basis, see Comment, supra note 198, at 564-66, which argues
that the treaty-by-treaty approach is "unwise," in part because it cannot avoid com-
menting implicitly on the presumed fairness of a country's judicial system. The Com-
ment also proposes criteria for defining "political" crimes and disapproves of the usur-
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of a double standard in United States extradition practice. In the
United Kingdom and other western liberal democracies, all violent
crime, regardless of motive, will bar the invocation of the political of-
fense exception. The United States, by concluding this type of treaty
with such countries, places its imprimatur on the political and legal
status quo in those countries. Conversely, the United States will be im-
plying that it does not have confidence in the political and legal status
quo in nations with which it does not conclude similar treaties. Such
diverse treatment may cause America's nondemocratic allies to exert
pressure for the execution of similar treaties limiting the scope of the
political offense exception. These countries could conceivably use a new
treaty as a precondition for the use of military bases by American
forces, but submission to their demands could signal the end of the po-
litical offense exception even for democratic rebels. Despite this trouble-
some double standard, the present United States Administration insists
that it will not be pressured into concluding similar treaties with
nondemocratic states. Abraham Sofaer, the State Department Legal
Adviser, insisted during the Senate hearings on the Supplementary
Treaty that new treaties with limited political offense exception provi-
sions would not be concluded with countries that have "no open system
of political opposition and dissent," or "where the system of justice is
fundamentally unfair."203 Nevertheless, there are those who believe
that the Administration is planning to, and should, conclude similar
treaties with all American allies, regardless of their political color.2
One incident lending credibility to critics is the Reagan Adminis-
tration's attempt to negotiate a new extradition treaty with the Philip-
pines in 1981. Despite his imposition of ten years of martial law205 and
pation of the power of the judiciary in extradition proceedings. See id. at 567-72; see
also Hearings, supra note 2, at 104-06 (statement of Prof. Christopher Pyle) (advocat-
ing judicial retention of decisionmaking authority with respect to the political nature of
crimes, and arguing against the double standard applied to "political refugees" through
analysis of their countries legal systems). For an analysis of how Western European
governments have dealt with the problem of extraditing alleged terrorists see Baker,
supra note 110. Baker, while noting that its effectiveness has been criticized, concludes
that the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism is a viable regional tool
for combating terrorism. See id. at 5.
20. Hearings, supra note 2, at 20 (statement of Judge Abraham Sofaer).
204 See Lauter, U.S., Britain Sign New Pact on Fugitives, NAT'L L.J., July 29,
1985, at 5 (quoting Stephen Trott, Assistant Attorney General). A third position is that
the Administration will be selective with respect to its eradication of the political of-
fense exception, but that the selection will be based on subjective political leanings and
the preferences of the Administration, rather than on a principled analysis of the fair-
ness of a foreign legal system. See id. at 33 (quoting former Attorney General Ramsey
Clark's statement implying that the Administration wants to accommodate Britain but
not, for example, Nicaragua, regardless of fairness of process).
20I See Hearings, supra note 2, at 119 (statement of Prof. Christopher Pyle) (not-
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his government's appalling human rights record,2 °8 former Philippine
dictator Ferdinand Marcos was offered aid by the Reagan Administra-
tion in obtaining the extradition of his enemies from the United States.
One of those enemies was Senator Benigno Aquino, Marcos's main po-
litical rival, then in exile in the United States.20 7 The extradition treaty
under negotiation at that time would have limited the political offense
exception in a manner similar to that of the Supplementary Treaty
discussed in this Comment.20 ' After the treaty was signed on November
27, 1981, Marcos obtained arrest warrants for some forty Philippine
exiles-including Senator Aquino-who were accused of "seditious"
and "subversive" activities against the Marcos regime.209 The public
outcry against Marcos's tactics was so great, however, that the State
Department never submitted the treaty to the Senate for its required
consent.21° Throughout this episode, the Reagan Administration contin-
ued to praise the Marcos regime as "democratic" and to call Marcos
himself a "voice for reason and moderation,"2"1 indicating that this Ad-
ministration defines "democratic" very loosely when claiming that it
will limit supplementary treaties to democratic allies. Although the
Philippines has a new, more progressive government, other American
allies with less-than-distinguished human rights records, such as South
Africa and South Korea, could also be eager for a new treaty.
IV. A PROPOSAL
The Supplementary Treaty is open to criticism because of its ret-
roactivity, and because of the double standard it creates. What is per-
haps most objectionable, however, is the Supplemental Treaty's broad
sweep in removing offenders from the protection of the political offense
exception."'
A preferable solution might have been the negotiation by the
United States and the United Kingdom of a treaty defining "political
offense" by whether the violent act was directed against officers of the
ing that martial law was in effect from 1972-1981).
206 See id. (citing the findings of the International League for Human Rights and
of Amnesty International that thousands were "detained on suspicion of subversive ac-
tivity" and that "many of those jailed were brutalized or tortured by their interro-
gators," frequently without having been convicted of any crime).
2I See id. at 119-20.
208 See id. at 120 (The treaty "proposed transferring administration of the politi-
cal crimes defense from the judiciary to the State Department.").
20 See id. Aquino's voluntary return to the Philippines ended in his assassination
on August 21, 1983. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
210 See Hearings, supra note 2, at 120 (statement of Prof. Christopher Pyle).
211 Id. at 122.
212 See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
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state, or against civilians. By categorically denying the exception to
those who attacked civilians, such a treaty would allow the punishment
of the most offensive type of terrorist acts. Both the Eain213 and
Quinn2 14 courts seemed to follow this line of reasoning when they de-
nied the exception to fugitives who attacked civilians. The community's
sense of outrage is far greater when civilians are attacked because such
violence is usually arbitrary and does not directly harm the state. At-
tacks against police officers and soldiers, however, are more obviously
attacks against the state and seem covered by the traditional notion of a
political offense. Even this solution is unsatisfactory, however, for the
real issue is not who the victim is but whether the alleged offender can
get a fair trial in ,the requesting state. It is the conflict between the
right to a fair trial and the need to punish terrorists that must be
resolved.
It is highly doubtful that an alleged political offender can get a
fair trial in the requesting state, for her crimes were committed against
the very institutions determining her guilt or innocence. A better alter-
native is to have a third party make that determination. The European
Community, for example, could establish a special criminal court to try
alleged terrorists from the Community's member states. Since many of
the Community's members suffer from terrorist violence, they would
have an incentive to see that such a court operates successfully.
Under this scheme, each of the member states would contribute
judges, prosecutors, and other court personnel to the system. When an
alleged political offender is on trial, under no circumstances could the
judge be of the same nationality as the accused. This would better en-
sure a fair trial for the accused and protect the interests of the injured
state in seeing that justice is done. Such a system would also help the
United States avoid the dilemma it currently faces with respect to the
extradition of terrorists. By returning the accused to an impartial Euro-
pean court, the United States would avoid having to decide between
returning a fugitive to a state where she may not get a fair trial, or
offending that state by not returning the fugitive at all.
Under the proposed scheme, the fugitive being sought for extradi-
tion would have to petition the special terrorist court to obtain its pro-
tection. In order to invoke its jurisdiction, the court would have to de-
termine if the fugitive had made at least a prima facie showing that the
offense she was accused of committing was politically motivated. If the
fugitive made such a showing, the court could make an extradition re-
21 Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
214 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271
(1986).
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quest to the country holding the fugitive. The special court would then
try the fugitive under the regular procedural and substantive criminal
law of the offended state. Alternatively, the European Community
could formulate its own body of procedures as well as its own criminal
code, to which provisions the Community's states would assent by
treaty.
There is an important precedent in the area of European interstate
cooperation that could serve as a model for the proposed court. That
model is the European Court of Human Rights, which was established
pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights. This court
has found several Community states, including the United Kingdom,
guilty of human rights violations.215 Indeed, the judicial machinery es-
tablished pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights is
considered the most advanced and effective system for the protection of
human rights in the world.216
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, states, or in-
dividuals, if they have exhausted all legal remedies in their national
legal systems, can petition the European Commission if they believe
that a signatory state has violated the European Convention.217 After
investigating the factual averments in the complaint, the Commission
then attempts to facilitate a settlement between the parties.21 8 If no set-
tlement is reached, the Commission draws up a report stating whether
or not the defendant state has violated the Convention.219 Within three
months of the issuance of the report, the Commission, or any of the
parties involved in the dispute, can take the case to the European Court
of Human Rights.22 In cases in which the Court has found violations
of the Convention, states have taken remedial action to correct their
behavior. For example, after the Golder Case,221 the British govern-
ment changed its prison regulations in order to eliminate the practice of
allowing prison authorities to control communications between a pris-
oner and her lawyer.222 Similarly, even before the Court's decision in
Ireland v. United Kingdom,223 Britain ceased to employ the so-called
215 See supra note 176.
216 For a detailed description of the Convention see Higgins, The European Con-
vention on Human Rights, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL
AND POLICY IssuEs 495 (T. Meron ed. 1984).
217 See id. at 505-06.
218 See id. at 506.
219 See id. at 506-07.
220 See id. at 507.
221 1975 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUM. RTS. 290 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.).
222 See Higgins, supra note 216, at 509.
223 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
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"five interrogation techniques." 22
CONCLUSION
The new United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradi-
tion Treaty appears to represent an effective means by which two dem-
ocratic allies can prevent those accused of committing violent acts for
political purposes from escaping justice. Moreover, the treaty provides a
safeguard for the accused by denying extradition if the evidence against
the fugitive is incredible or if she would not receive a fair trial upon
her return.
The problem with this new treaty is that, although it remedies
certain problems that existed under the old regime, it still does not re-
solve adequately the problem of how to deal fairly with alleged political
offenders. Article 1, for example, sweeps too broadly in its denial of the
political offense exception to those who commit acts of political vio-
lence. It ignores the possibility that there may be some circumstances
under which a person committing such an act deserves protection.
Unless the liberal democracies establish a system whereby an al-
leged fugitive terrorist would be tried by an impartial third party such
as the European Community, the United States should not negotiate
treaties with other allies eliminating the political offense exception for
all violent crimes. Rather, if the exception is to be limited at all, it
should be denied to those who commit acts of violence against civilians.
224 Higgins, supra note 216, at 509.
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